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OBSCENITY: FROM HICKLIN
TO HICKLIN?
Frank W. Smith, Jr.*
Modern advances in printing, distribution and adver-
tisement have accentuated an old problem of social and
legal significance-what, if anything, should be done to
control obscene publications 71 Increased concern with the
problem has been shown not only by organizations active
in this area, by numerous articles and books which have
recently been written, but also by the courts, highlighted
by the recent Ginzburg,2 Mishkin' and Fanny Hill' cases.
These cases have been hailed by some as a license for a
full scale war on the "smut peddlers" ' and by others
as a caution to proceed slowly.6 The obscenity problem
brings into focus questions and considerations facing
the law in this and many other areas today: (1)Are there
tentative or working definitions of goals ? (2) What means
*Instructor, Law School, University of Richmond. B.A., University of Vir-
ginia, 1955; LL.B., University of Richmond, 1962.
1. That obscene publications are a problem is well documented by Rogers,
Police Control of Obscene Literature, 57 J. ORIm. L. 0. & P. S. 430,
457-568 (1966). Such publication is a multi-million dollar business
annually, estimated to be $18 million a year in paperback books alone.
Rogers catalogues the recent development in the obscene: from em-
phasis in early 1962 on "normal" heterosexual activity, to increased
emphasis on the "abnormal"-lesbianism, sado-masochistic behavior, and
homosexuality-since that time.
2. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
3. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
4. Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966).
5. Armstrong, A Victory Over the Smut Peddlers, READERS DIGEST, Feb-
ruary 1967, p. 147.
6. Ablard, Obscenity, Advertising, and Publishing: The Impact of Ginz-
burg and Mishkin, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 85, 90-92 (1966), indicates
that the policy of the Post Office Department and the Department of
Justice will be one of restraint.
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and alternatives are available to reach such goals? (3)
Are present approaches oriented to such goals or merely
hold-overs from periods with different priorities of con-
cerns and values? (4)What are the results under pres-
ent methods-are they creating greater hazards than
those "cured"? (5)Is the problem a valid concern for
control by legal processes or is it an area which should be
left to other means of influencing and controlling be-
havior?
With the foregoing in mind, an observation made by
the reporters for the Model Penal Code in their study of
control of obscenity by means of criminal sanctions is
pertinent:
Church tribunals no longer have power to pun-
ish, but the question of properly limiting the
power of the secular courts remains in part a
matter of distinguishing secular from spiritual
concerns, since not all matters of the spirit, fit
for religious guidance or control, may be use-
fully or safely entrusted to police and courts.
The boundary between secular and spiritual con-
trols can never be drawn permanently or with
absolute precision. Allocation of responsibility
between state and church, or between state and
individual, shifts with changing political con-
ditions.7
The Past Approach to Obscenity:
The Hicklin Era'
Although a common law court as early as 1663 had
held the obscene conduct of Sir Charles Sedley in ex-
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, at 6 (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1957).
8. For a detailed account of this, see Alpert, judicial Censorship of Ob-
scene Literature, 52 HARV. L. Rv. 40 (1938); Lockhart & McClure,
Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L.
REv. 295 (1954).
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hibiting himself nude on a balcony and throwing down a
bottle of "offensive liquor" among the people of Covent
Garden as punishable by fine,' until the early 1700's,
punishment for obscenity was almost exclusively the con-
cern of the ecclesiastical courts of the Church of Eng-
land. The common law courts, even as late as 1708, held
in Queen v. Read that:
A crime that shakes religion, as profaneness on
the stage is indictable, but writing an obscene
book as that entitled "The Fifteen Plagues of a
Maidenhead" is not indictable, but punishable
only in the Spiritual Courts. °
However, by 1727, in Rex v. Curl" it was held that
publication of an obscene libel was punishable as a com-
mon law libel as being "against the peace in tending to
weaken the bonds of civil society, virtue and morality."'"
It has been suggested that up to this time, the primary
concern had been with offenses against religion, not ob-
scenity itself."
Lord Campbell, best known for legislation bearing his
name in the tort field, was largely responsible for the
first English legislation dealing with obscenity which was
passed in 1857."' The act was "intended as a protection
9. Sir Charles Sydlyes Case, 1 Keble 620, 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K. B. 1663).
For an account of the somewhat amusing details of the case, see Al-
pert, supra note 8, at 41-42.
10. 11 Mod. 142, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (1708).
11. 2 Str. 789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K. B. 1727).
12. Id. at 791.
13. Alpert, supra note 8, at 44.
14. Lord Campbell's Act, with revisions made by Parliament in 1959,
along with the common law and Hicklin, remains the basic law on ob-
scenity in England. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 7, at 86;
Rice, The Youth-Obscenity Problem-A Proposal, 52 Ky. L. J. 429,
437-8 (1964); Comment, Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal
Survey-1964-66, 41 Notre Dame Law. 681, 755, n. 608 (1966).
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for children against the abundant pornographic pamph-
lets, books then in circulation. ' I' 5 Lord Campbell is said
to have used tactics, not unknown to other politicians, of
"putting 'the law Lords' in a position of supporting his
bill or else being attacked as advocates of vice.'2
Lord Campbell's Act produced a case decided in 1868
by the Court of the Queen's Bench which was to cast a
long shadow on the law of obscenity for much of the next
century. Queen v. Hicklin" arose out of the political and
religious infighting of the time in England. The defend-
ant, Henry Scott, was a member of the Protestant Elec-
toral Union whose purpose was to
protect against those teachings and practices
which are un-English, immoral and blasphemous,
to maintain the Protestantism of the Bible and
the liberty of England and to promote the return
to Parliament of men who will assist them in
these objects, and particularly will expose and
defeat the deep-laid machinations of the Jesuits,
and resist grants of money for Romish pur-
poses. 8
To promote these purposes of the Society, Scott sold
a pamphlet, The Confessional Unmasked, showing the
depravity of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of the
confessional and the questions put to females in con-
fession.
Lord Campbell's Act, 20 & 21 Victoria C. 83, S.1, pro-
vided that obscene materials, books, prints, etc., could be
seized and destroyed upon proof that such articles had
been sold or distributed and were of "such a character
and description that the publication of them would be a
15. Alpert, Supra note 8, at 51.
16. Id. at 51-52, n. 29.
17. Law Reports, 3 Q.B. 359 (1868).
18. Id. at 360.
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misdemeanor and proper to be prosecuted as such."' 19
The basic assumption of the act was that the publication
of obscene materials was punishable as a common law
misdemeanor. In determining whether Scott's publica-
tion of the materials could be punished as a misdemeanor
and thus sustain the seizure, Lord Cockburn laid down
the Hicklin test of obscenity:
... I think the test of obscenity is this, whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity
is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.20
The court, apparently accepting the good motives of
Scott, in holding that the pamphlets could be destroyed
even though there was no pecuniary gain to Scott, found
that half of the pamphlet dealing with "casuistical and
controversial questions" was not obscene, but that the
remainder was obscene as relating to "impure and filthy
acts, words and ideas." Several of the judges acknowl-
edged that censorship of obscenity by criminal punish-
ment must depend on the circumstances of the publica-
tion, anticipating a problem to face later courts.
Thus under the Hicklin test, material which was par-
tially obscene could be suppressed by seizure and de-
struction if a part tended to deprave and corrupt those
minds open to such immoral influence.
The first reported case in the United States was Com-
monwealth v. Holmes" in 1821, involving a book, Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure, in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that "an obscene libel was a
common law offense and punishable as a crime." Ironic-
ally, this is probably the same book, commonly called
19. The text of the statute is found Id. at 360.
20. Id. at 369.
21. 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
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Fanny Hill, involved in the most recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States.2
According to Lockhart & McClure,2 1 prior to the Civil
War there were few reported decisions involving obscene
literature in the United States. They suggest this prob-
ably was not an indication that such literature was not
available nor that there were no attempts at censorship.
For example, Nathaniel Hawthorne's now classic, The
Scarlet Letter, was bitterly attacked as an "immoral
book that degraded literature and encouraged social lic-
entiousness. '1 2' A suggested reason for this dearth of
cases was that obscene literature was not thought to be a
problem of sufficient importance to justify arousing the
forces of the state to censorship. 5
Following the Civil War "the voice of the reformer
was heard in the land, ' 2 ' and the first real campaign in
the war on obscenity began in the United States. Anthony
Comstock, under the banner of "Morals, Not Art or
Literature" began, much like his English counterpart
Lord Campbell, to rid America of obscenity. Largely due
to his efforts, Congress, in 1873, passed the Comstock Act
broadening the existing legislation dealing with prohibi-
tions against importation of obscene material and use of
the mails for the transmission of obscenity. The Comstock
Act was amended in 1876 to grant the Post Office censor-
ship powers to confiscate obscene materials found in the
mails and to penalize mailers of such by means of non-
delivery.2
22. See Douglas' concurring opinion in Fanny Hill, 383 U.S. at 425, n. 1.
23. Supra note 8, at 324.
24. Id. at 325.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. For a survey of federal statutory developments, see Cairns, Paul &
Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumption of Anti-Obscenity Laws
and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1010, n. 2,
(1962). See also United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, at 160-163
(2d Cir. 1965).
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The real import of the Hicklin rule was brought out in
its adoption in 1879 by a federal court in United States v.
Bennett,28 apparently the first reported case in the United
States to adopt the Hicklin rule. In a criminal prosecu-
tion, reportedly instigated by Anthony Comstock, brought
under the provisions of the Comstock Act making it a
crime to deposit an obscene publication in the mails, the
trial judge in his charge to the jury had used the Hicklin
definition of obscenity. The judge had further charged
that the question of obscenity turned upon the alleged
obscene passages and not the publication taken as a
whole. In its charge, which was approved on appeal by
the circuit court, the court stated:
There has been some discussion in this case,
tending in the direction of the argument, that,
if the general scope of the book was not obscene,
the presence of obscene matter in it would not
bring it within this statute. Such is not the law.
If this book is, in any substantial part of it,
obscene . . . then it is non-mailable under this
statute and defendant is guilty.. . I have given
you the test; it is not ... [whether it tends] to
deprave your minds or the minds of every per-
son... It is within the law if it would suggest
impure and libidinous thoughts in the young and
the inexperienced.29
In applying Hicklin, the court thus stressed that it was
a "partly obscene test" and to be judged in terms of
"tendency," not actual effect, to deprave the most sus-
ceptible-the young and inexperienced.
A question which was to plague many later courts pre-
sented no difficulty to the Bennett court, which dismissed
it by saying:
28. 24 Fed. Cases, No. 14,571 (S.D.N.Y. 1879).
29. Id. at 1102.
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Of course, freedom of the press, which, I think,
was alluded to, has nothing to do with this case.
Freedom of the press does not include freedom
to use the mails for the purpose of distributing
obscene literature, and no right or privilege of
the press is infringed by the exclusion of obscene
literature from the mails.3"
The Hicklin rule was so emplanted by 1913 that Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerly,3 1 a criminal
prosecution against the publisher of Hagar Revelly, a
novel presenting the life of a young woman in New York
compelled to earn her living, said:
That test [Hicklin] has been accepted by the
lower federal courts until it would be no longer
proper for me to disregard it. U.S. v. Bennett,
16 Blatch 338, Fed. Cas. No. 14,571; U. S. v.
Clarke (D.C.), 38 Fed. 500; U.S. v. Harmon
(D.C.), 45 Fed. 414; U.S. v. Smith (D.C.), 45
Fed. 478." 2
Despite this, Hand was constrained to make a cogent
criticism of the test:
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the
rule as laid down, however consonant it may be
with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me
to answer to the understanding and morality of
the present time, as conveyed by the words, "ob-
scene, lewd, or lascivious." I question whether
in the end men will regard that as obscene which
is honestly relevant to the adequate expression
of innocent ideas, and whether they will not be-
lieve that truth and beauty are too precious to
society at large to be mutilated in the interests
30. Id. at 1101.
31. 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
32. Ibid.
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of those most likely to pervert them to base uses.
Indeed, it seems hardly likely that we are even
today so lukewarm in our interest in letters or
serious discussion as to be content to reduce our
treatment of sex to the standard of a child's li-
brary in the supposed interest of a salacious
few.... Yet, if the time is not yet when men think
innocent all that which is honestly germane to a
pure subject, however little it may mince its
words, still I scarcely think that they would for-
bid all which might corrupt the most corruptible,
or that society is prepared to accept for its own
limitations those which may perhaps be neces-
sary to the weakest of its members. If there be
no -abstract definition, such as I have suggested,
should not the word "obscene" be allowed to in-
dicate the present critical point in the compro-
mise between candor and shame at which the
community may have arrived here and now?
... To put thought in leash to the average con-
science of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy.
Nor is it an objection, I think, that such an inter-
pretation gives to the words of the statute a
varying meaning from time to time. 3
Thus Judge Hand aptly pointed out that the test
should not be one which reduces the public to reading
that which is fit only for children but that the test should
be a dynamic, changing test representing a balance be-
tween contemporary standards and what is clearly ob-
scene. Apparently, many courts both before and after
Kennerly shared these views of Hand and ignored or
otherwise circumvented the restrictive "partly obscene"
rule of Hicklin.'
33. Id. at 120-121.
34. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 8, at 327.
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The first significant challenge and break in the Hicklin
rule arose in 1933-34, from a book by James Joyce, hailed
by many as a classic. The federal government attempted
in United States v. One Book Called Ulysses3 to prohibit
importation of the book into the United States under fed-
eral statutes providing for confiscation and destruction
of obscene material sought to be imported. The district
judge, as trier of fact, accepted the definition of obscene
as material "tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead
to sexually impure and lustful thoughts," 6 but made
significant changes in determining if Ulysses met such
definition. The court said, "Whether a particular book
would tend to excite such impulses and thoughts must be
tested by the court's opinion as to its effect on a person
with average sex instincts ... who plays, in this branch
of legal inquiry, the same role as does the 'reasonable
man' in the law of torts. . . ." The court, in elevating the
standard to that which tends to deprave the average,
thereby met the thrust of Judge Learned Hand's criti-
cism that the Bennett and Hicklin tests for censorship of
obscenity would reduce the general population to reading
that which is fit only for the most susceptible-the least
common denominator. Further, a point considered, yet
dismissed by the Hicklin court,"7 was, ". .. the intent with
which the book was written, for ... in any case where a
book is claimed to be obscene it must first be determined,
whether the intent with which it was written was . ..
pornographic, that is, written for the purpose of exploit-
ing obscenity." 8 The trial court found that the book did
35. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
36. Id. at 184.
37. Lord Cockburn in Hicklin had dismissed the argument as to lack of
mens rea by saying, "where a man publishes a work manifestly obscene,
he must be taken to have had the intention which is implied from that
act." Supra note 17, at 372. Cockburn also acknowledged Scott did
not act for pecuniary gain.
38. Supra note 35, at 183.
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not have "the leer of the sensualist" and concluded that
it was not obscene. The court also suggested that the net
effect of the book must be obscene.
On appeal,39 Judge Augustus N. Hand clearly consid-
ered that the district court had found the book not ob-
scene, taken as a whole. Even though the appellate court
conceded parts were obscene, it felt that "the net effect
even of portions most open to attack . . . is pitiful and
tragic, rather than lustful."" ° The majority stated that
"the question in each case is whether a publication taken
as a whole has a libidinous effect." 1 The court specifi-
cally refused to follow the partly obscene test of Hicklin
and established its own test and the relevant considera-
tions:
We believe that the proper test of whether a
given book is obscene is its dominant effect. In
applying this test relevancy of the objectionable
parts to the theme, the established reputation of
the work in the estimation of approved critics if
the book is modern, and the verdict of the past,
if it is ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence;
for works of art are not likely to sustain a high
position with no better warrant for their exist-
ence than their obscene content."2
Some have said that Ulysses is one of the most important
decisions in the American law on obscenity.
Hicklin, however, was not buried by Ulysses without
the dissent of Judge Manton who argued that Hicklin,
Bennett and Kennerly should be followed, which he con-
39. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir.
1934).
40. Id. at 707.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 708.
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sidered had been approved by the Supreme Court in
Rosen v. United States.'" Manton queried,
And are we to refuse to enforce the statute...
because of the argument "obscenity is only the
superstition of the day-the modern counterpart
of ancient witchcraft"? Are we to be persuaded
by the statement made by the judge below in an
interview with the press, "Education, not law,
must solve problems of taste and choice of
books" 1"
The Constitutional Era
With the establishment of the Obscene in its Dominant
Effect Rule in Ulysses, with its consideration of social
values, the complexity of the problem became much more
evident. Up to Ulysses, the significant cases had not been
those of the Supreme Court but of other courts.
The Bill of Rights expressly set forth certain rights,
privileges and freedoms which could not be infringed
upon by Congress and the federal government. Among
these rights were "freedom of speech" and "freedom of
the press" guaranteed by the first amendment. A ques-
tion, to some degree still unresolved, " is to what extent is
the first amendment a restriction on the states through
the fourteenth amendment? In 1925, in Gitlow v. New
43. 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
44. Supra note 39, at 711.
45. Harlan, under his concept of federalism, views the fourteenth amend-
ment as having a less restrictive impact on state control of obscenity
than does the first amendment on the federal government. Most of
the other Justices seem to assume that the first and fourteenth apply
with equal impact, in the control of obscenity, to the state and federal
governments. For Harlan's view see discussion regarding Roth, infra,
page 308-311 and Ginzburg, infra, page 324-325.
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York,"' where a New York penal statute relating to ad-
vocacy of criminal anarchy was questioned, the Court in
dictum said:
For present purposes we may and do assume
that freedom of speech and of the press-which
are protected by the first amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the funda-
mental personal rights and "liberties" protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment from impairment by the States."'
This view seems also to have been accepted by the Su-
preme Court in Fiske v. Kansas."8 These statements fore-
shadowed a more active role by the Court in reviewing
state regulation of obscenity. However, from Ulysses to
shortly after World War II, although some cases were
decided -by the United States Supreme Court, there was
little of landmark significance in the development of the
law of obscenity.
In 1948 the Supreme Court in Doubleday & Co. v. New
York ' was presented with the question of the constitu-
tionality of state censorship of obscenity. Doubleday had
been convicted in the New York courts of publishing an
obscene book, Memoirs of Hecate County by Edmund
Wilson, a well known literary critic.50 Doubleday ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court relying on the
first amendment, as applicable to the states by the four-
teenth, and argued that literature dealing with sex prob-
lems and obscenity could be suppressed only if the pub-
lication created a "clear and present danger." However,
46. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
47. Id. at 666.
48. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
49. 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
50. For a detailed account of the case, see Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 8, at 295-301.
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the Supreme Court was evenly divided,5 ' did not resolve
the problem and issued no opinion, thus affirming Double-
day's conviction.
But in 1957 the deadlock was broken in Butler v.
Michigan,2 which was unusual in the field of obscenity for
its near unanimity of opinion with Justice Frankfurter
speaking for eight of the justices and Justice Black con-
curring in the result. The background of Butler, as given
by Lockhart & McClure, " is quite interesting. This was
a pre-arranged test of a Michigan statute which pro-
hibited under penal sanction the sale, even to adults, of
obscene material "tending to incite minors to violent or
depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the cor-
ruption of the morals of youth."5" The book questioned
was John H. Griffin's The Devil Rides Outside. The test
used by the prosecutor to determine if he should prosecute
was quite basic: "If he didn't want his thirteen-year-old
daughter reading it, it was illegal.""5 The defendant was
found guilty in the Recorder's Court in Detroit of selling
an obscene book. The defendant then applied for leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which con-
sented to the granting of the application "because the is-
sues involved in this case are of great public interest, and
because it appears that further clarification of the lan-
guage of . . . [the statute] is necessary.""6 The appeal,
however, was denied. In the United States Supreme Court
the defendant's argument was based on the first and
fourteenth amendments. The precise basis for the holding
of the Court is hard to determine from the opinion, but
51. Justice Frankfurter did not participate in the decision.
52. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
53. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 13-18 (1960).
54. MICHIGAN PENAL CODE, § 343. The text of the statute is found in the
report of the case, supra note 52, at 381.
55. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 53, at 15.
56. Supra note 52, at 382.
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the following appears to be the salient portion of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion:
It is clear on the record that appellant was con-
victed because Michigan... made it an offense
for him to make available for the general read-
ing public (and he in fact sold to a police officer)
a book that the trial judge found to have a po-
tentially deleterious influence upon youth. The
State insists that, by thus quarantining the
general reading public against books not too
rugged for grown men and women in order to
shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its
power to promote the general welfare. Surely,
this is to burn the house to roast the pig. Indeed,
the Solicitor General of Michigan with character-
istic candor, advised the Court that Michigan has
a statute specifically designed to protect its chil-
dren against obscene matter "tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth." But the ap-
pellant was not convicted of violating this
statute.
We have before us legislation not reasonably re-
stricted to the evil with which it is said to deal.
The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the
adult population of Michigan to reading only
what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily
curtails one of those liberties of the individual,
now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attest-
ed as the indispensable conditions for the main-
tenance and progress of a free society. 7
Thus, Butler quite clearly marked the death of Hicklin,
at least insofar as it could be used as a test of what ma-
terial could be proscribed for general circulation. In do-
ing so, the Court picked out the precise weakness which
57. Id. at 382-384.
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Judge Learned Hand had objected to some forty years
earlier.
The impact of Butler was felt almost immediately. Sev-
eral states repealed statutes which were probably uncon-
stitutional under the Butler ruling, and other states acted
after their statutes had been invalidated by court deci-
sions." In Virginia the provisions of Virginia Code An-
notated 1950, § 18-113, almost identical to the statute in-
volved in Butler, were challenged in Goldstein v. Com-
monwealth. 9 The Supreme Court of Appeals, relying on
Butler, said:
We are of opinion that so much of Code, § 18-113
as undertakes to provide a standard of judging
obscenity dependent upon the undesirable effect
the offensive material may have upon youth is
unconstitutional and invalid. Since the convic-
tion of the appellant was based upon such a
standard, we are constrained to reverse the
judgment appealed from."0
Following this, in 1960 the General Assembly of Virginia
enacted a comprehensive statute to deal with obscenity. 1
Having broken the logjam in Butler, the Supreme
Court in two decisions some three months later was faced
with a flood of unanswered questions. By then the un-
animity of the Court had disappeared, and in the journey
through the shoals and rapids, most of the justices took
different rafts, so that to the present it is difficult to tell
which raft is in the mainstream. The two decisions, Roth
58. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 53, at 17-18.
59. 200 Va. 25, 104 S.E. 2d 66 (1958).
60. Id. at 29.
61. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 18.1-227-236. For a comment see 17 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 322, 327-28 (1960).
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v. United States and Alberts v. California,62 were decided
together and produced four written opinions. In Roth the
constitutionality of the federal statute prohibiting the
mailing of obscene material was questioned, and in Al-
berts the California Penal Code prohibiting sale of ob-
scene material was challenged. In both cases the statutes
were upheld and the convictions affirmed. Brennan,
speaking for the majority, stated:
[T]he dispositive question is whether obscenity
is utterance within the area of protected speech
and press. Although this is the first time the
question has been squarely presented to this
Court either under the First Amendment or un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, expressions
found in numerous opinions indicate that this
Court has always assumed that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press.63
In Brennan's view it was clear from the history of the
first amendment that, despite its unconditional phrasing,
it was not intended to protect every utterance.' What is
the significance of thus classifying "obscene speech" as
not speech or expression within the meaning of the first
amendment? By adopting this "two-level theory"" of
62. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For an excellent account of these cases see
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 53, at 19-29; Kalven, The Meta-
physics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuPREmE CouRT REvmw 1 at
7-28 (1960).
63. Supra note 62, at 481. Brennan noted that no question was presented as
to the obscenity of the material involved in either case.
64. Id. at 483. Kalven, supra note 62, at 9, expressed great difficulty with
the logic of this approach. For a rebuttal of the historical argument
see Douglas, concurring in Fanny Hill, supra note 4, at 428-430.
65. In doing so the majority relied on its holdings that libel is not speech
within the protection of the first amendment, Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Schenck v. Uhited States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919). An outstanding authority, Kalven, supra note 62, at 17 ex-
pressed concern with this formulation: "It [Rot, majority] is un-
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speech, Brennan avoided a difficult question which was
argued in Both and which had earlier been argued but
undecided in Doubleday.6 The argument was that the
traditional test of when speech may be restrained under
the first amendment-the "clear and present danger"
test-should apply in obscenity cases. 7 It has been
seriously questioned whether any such danger of anti-
social conduct resulting from obscene material can be
shown from any empirical data or other reliable source.
Indeed, many writers conclude that there is no provable
relationship between use of pornographic materials and
anti-social conduct. 8 If the "clear and present danger"
test were applied to obscenity, the probable result would
be that no obscene publication could be suppressed."
In disposing of the freedom of expression considera-
tions, Brennan stated: "All ideas having even the slight-
est redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, con-
troversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
satisfactory, too, because in an effort to solve the small problem of
obscenity, it gave a major endorsement to the two-level theory that
may have unhappy repercussions on the protection of free speech
generally."
66. See discussion on Doubleday, supra page 301.
67. Query as to whether Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
modifies the traditional test and introduces a "balancing" factor by
saying at 510, "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of
evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." For a discussion of this,
see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 8, at 363-368.
68. For an excellent survey of the studies made of the relationship of ob-
scenity and pornography to conduct, see Cairns, Paul & Wishner,
supra note 27; Rogers, supra note 1, at 431-438. At best the "evi-
dence" seems to be inconclusive, and there is a great need for study
in this area.
69. The American Civil Liberties Union, which has been quite active in
opposing censorship, has admitted in its amicus briefs that this is the
probable result. Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Ob-
scenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L. J. 127 at 131, n.
19 (1966).
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climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guar-
anties." 7
0
Brennan then made an attempt to define obscenity:
However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous.
Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest,
[adding by way of a footnote] i.e., material hav-
ing a tendency to excite lustful thoughts... We
perceive no significant difference between the
meaning of obscenity developed in the case law
-and the definition of the A.L.I. Model Penal
Code, § 207-10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) viz.
"... A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest,
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,
or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or rep-
resentation of such matters ....
In speaking of the Hicklin rule, Brennan said: "Some
American courts adopted this standard, but later deci-
sions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community
,'tandards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
-rhole appeals to prurient interest.1 72 He acknowledged
that such a test met constitutional requirements.
These comments of Brennan--"slightest redeeming so-
cial impiortance," "predominant appeal to prurient in-
terest" and "substantially beyond contemporary com-
munity standards' '--spawned later controversy: Are
they indispensible and independent elements for censor-
ship I
70. Roth, supra note 62, at 484.
71. Id. at 487. Equating of the Model Penal Code's definition with the
various definitions established by cases seems to do injustice to the
Code as was'pointed out by Harlan's dissent in Roth, supra note 62, at
499.
72. Id. at 489.
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Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result in Roth
and Alberts but would have limited the decision to the
facts of the cases. He expressed concern with the broad
language used by Brennan and feared that it might be
applied to the arts, sciences and communication generally.
Warren made a significant observation:
That there is a social problem presented by ob-
scenity is attested by the expression of the legis-
latures of the forty-eight States as well as Con-
gress. To recognize the existence of a problem,
however, does not require that we sustain any
and all measures adopted to meet that problem.
The history of the application of laws designed
to suppress the obscene demonstrates convinc-
ingly that the power of government can be in-
voked under them against great art or literature,
scientific treatises, or work exciting social con-
troversy. Mistakes of the past prove that there
is a strong countervailing interest to be consid-
ered in the freedoms guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.7"
Warren argued that the central issue was the conduct
of the defendant, not the book or material. To Warren
both defendants were purveying matter openly adver-
tised to appeal to the erotic interest of customers and
were engaged in commercial exploitation of prurient
interests.
Justice Harlan concurred in the result in Alberts but
dissented in Roth. Harlan had serious misgivings with
what he considered the majority formula: obscenity is not
within the area of protected speech and press and is a
classifiable genus of speech. In Harlan's view this re-
duced the constitutional question of whether a particular
book can be suppressed to a question of fact to be re-
73. Id. at 495.
OBSCENITY: FROM HICKLIN TO HICKLIN 309
solved by the finder of fact. To Harlan, each book sought
to be suppressed raises individual constitutional ques-
tions to be resolved finally by an appellate court for it-
self and the responsibility for making the constitutional
determination in each case can not be avoided by rel-
egating it to a factual labelling of "obscene" by the trier
of fact.
For Harlan, Roth, dealing with federal statutes, posed
a different problem than Alberts, involving a state stat-
ute. Harlan considered the scope of review in Alberts to
be narrow:
We do not decide whether the policy of the State
is wise, or whether it is based on assumptions
scientifically substantiated. We can inquire only
whether the State action so subverts the funda-
mental liberties implicit in the Due Process
Clause that it cannot be sustained as a rational
exercise of power .... The States' power to make
printed words criminal is, of course, confined by
the Fourteenth Amendment, but only insofar as
such power is inconsistent with our concepts of
"ordered liberty.' ""
The California legislature, in Harlan's opinion, would
not be irrational in determining that pornography can
induce sexual conduct obnoxious to the moral fabric of
society and could reasonably draw the inference that in-
discriminate dissemination of such materials would have
an eroding effect on moral standards. He further stated:
Above all stands the realization that we deal
here with an area where knowledge is small,
data are insufficient, and experts are divided.
Since the domain of sexual morality is pre-
eminently a matter of state concern, this Court
74. Id. at 501.
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should be slow to interfere with state legislation
calculated to protect that morality."
Roth, however, presented to Harlan a question under
the first amendment significantly different from that of
state legislation under the fourteenth:
Not only is the federal interest in protecting the
Nation against pornography attenuated, but the
dangers of federal censorship in this field are far
greater than anything the States may do. It has
often been said that one of the great strengths of
our federal system is that we have, in the forty-
eight States, forty-eight experimental social lab-
oratories. "State statutory law reflects pre-
dominantly this capacity of a legislature to in-
troduce novel techniques of social control .... "
Different States will have different attitudes
toward the same work of literature. The same
book which is freely read in one State may be
classed as obscene in another. And it seems to
me that no overwhelming danger to our freedom
to experiment and to gratify our tastes in liter-
ature is likely to result from the suppression of
a borderline book in one of the States, so long
as there is no uniform nation-wide suppression
of the book, and so long as other States are free
to experiment with the same or bolder books.
Quite a different situation is presented, however,
where the Federal Government imposes the ban.
The danger is perhaps not great if the people of
one State, through their legislature, decide that
"Lady Chatterly's Lover" goes so far beyond
the acceptable standards of candor that it will be
deemed offensive and non-sellable, for the State
next door is still free to make its own choice. At
least we do not have one uniform standard. But
75. Id. at 502.
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the dangers to free thought and expression are
truly great if the Federal Government imposes a
blanket ban over the Nation on such a book. 6
Harlan, following this concept of federalism, expressed
the view that federal statutes could constitutionally reach
only "hard-core" pornography. He would have reversed
Roth's conviction, because the material was not "hard-
core" and because the federal government has no power
to bar sale of books because they might lead to any kind
of "thoughts."
Douglas and Black dissented in both Roth and Alberts,
arguing that the convictions could not be upheld under
"the First Amendment, which by its terms is a restraint
on Congress and which by the Fourteenth is a restraint
on the States.""'
They expressed the opinion that:
[B]y these standards [used in Alberts] punish-
ment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for
overt acts nor antisocial conduct. This test can-
not be squared with our decisions under the First
Amendment. Even the ill-starred Dennis case
conceded that speech to be punishable must have
some relation to action which could be penalized
by government. This issue cannot be avoided by
saying that obscenity is not protected by the
First Amendment.... To allow the State to step
in and punish mere speech or publication that
the judge or the jury thinks has an undesirable
impact on thoughts but that is not shown to be a
part of unlawful action is drastically to curtail
the First Amendment.... If we were certain that
impurity of sexual thoughts impelled to action,
we would be on less dangerous ground in punish-
ing the distributors of this sex literature. But
76. Id. at 505-506.
77. Id. at 508.
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it is by no means clear that obscene literature, as
so defined, is a significant factor in influencing
substantial deviations from the community
standards. 8
The gist of Douglas and Black's argument was that
government should be concerned with anti-social conduct,
not utterances or thoughts. To Douglas, the first amend-
ment should allow protests even against the moral code
that the standard of the day sets for the community; but
to suppress expression, it must be so "closely brigaded
with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it."
Douglas' view is that:
The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms
absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well
as legislatures from weighing the values of
speech against silence. The First Amendment
puts free speech in the preferred position .... I
would give the broad sweep of the First Amend-
ment full support. I have the same confidence in
the ability of our people to reject noxious litera-
ture as I have in their capacity to sort out the
true from the false in theology, economics, poli-
tics, or any other field. 9
From Roth in 1957 to 1966, the status quo prevailed to
a large extent, if there was any "status" during that
time. Several cases dealing with obscene publications
found their way to the United States Supreme Court,
but, apparently from the diversity of opinion within the
Court, did not result in written opinions. These per
curiam opinions all reversed convictions, including those
involving a nudist and a homosexual magazine."0 The im-
78. Id. at 509-510.
79. Id. at 514.
80. Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180, reversing 247 F.2d 148 (9th
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pact of these per curiam decisions, however, indicated to
law enforcement officials the reach of freedom of expres-
sion and the narrow limits of censorship of obscenity. It
became apparent that law enforcement officials could
move with assurance only against "hard-core" porno-
graphy.81
Following these per curiam decisions, the Court de-
cided a significant case which reflected the Court's think-
ing on "ideological" or "thematic" obscenity. In Kings-
ley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University
of New York,8" the New York courts had denied a license
to a French film version of Lady Chatterly's Lover be-
cause it portrayed acts of sexual immorality-adultery
-"as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of be-
havior" even though the film was not obscene. 3 The Su-
preme Court was unanimous in reversing, although
various opinions and grounds for the reversal were ex-
pressed. The majority opinion of Stewart held that the
action of New York unconstitutionally infringed on the
basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas. As Bren-
nan had pointed out in Roth, the freedom to advocate
unorthodox, controversial or even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate have the full protection of the con-
stitutional guarantees.
Many proponents of censorship were shocked by the
Cir. 1957) ("art" magazine); One, Inc. v. Olsen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958),
reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) (homosexual magazine); Sun-
shine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249
F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (nudist magazine). For comment on these
cases see Kalven, supra note 6, at 42-44; Lockhart & McClure, supra
note 53, at 32-39.
81. Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Obscenity Problem, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 834, 842 (1964), concluded that only hard-core pornography
was obscene. Federal officials appear to have come to the same con-
clusion. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 53, at 35, n. 170.
82. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
83. Id. at 686-7.
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decision which they considered had given constitutional
protection to "ideological" obscenity and the advocacy
of what, by many, would be considered immoral ideas.
Some congressmen said that the Court had endorsed
adultery. Other persons said the Court was anti-Christian
and part of a pro-Communist conspiracy."
During the period between Roth and Ginzburg, the
Court decided a case in 1959 which, although it did not
contribute to the developing concept of obscenity, may
yet have a significant effect on censorship of obscenity
by means of criminal sanctions. Smith v. Californial5
reversed a conviction under a municipal ordinance which
had been construed to impose absolute or strict criminal
liability on a book dealer for possession of an obscene
book without requiring any element of scienter.
Brennan spoke for a majority of five in saying:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowl-
edge of the contents of the book on the part of
the seller, the ordinance tends to impose a severe
limitation on the public's access to constitution-
ally protected matter. For if the bookseller is
criminally liable without knowledge of the con-
tents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he
will tend to restrict the books he sells to those
he has inspected; and thus the State will have
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of
constitutionally protected as well as obscene lit-
erature. . . . The bookseller's self-censorship,
compelled by the State, would be a censorship
affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent
for being privately administered.86
Brennan took great pains to point out that Smith was
84. Gerber, supra note 81, at 842; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 53,
at 42.
85. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
86. Id. at 153.
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not deciding "what sort of mental element is requisite
to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of a book-
seller for carrying an obscene book in stock" but that a
complete elimination of all mental elements from the
crime would not meet constitutional requirements.87
Another case decided during this period of turmoil
within the Court is worthy of note. The written opinion
in Jacobellis v. Ohioss probably represents the views of
only Brennan and Goldberg, but gives some insight into
Brennan's view of Roth. Jacobellis had been convicted in
Ohio of possessing and exhibiting an obscene film en-
titled Les Amants or The Lovers. This conviction was re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court. To Brennan,
the dispositive question was whether the state court had
properly found the film obscene and thus not entitled to
protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. Bren-
nan faced the suggestion that obscenity was a factual
determination and that the Supreme Court's only func-
tion on review was to determine, as in other areas, wheth-
er the ruling below was supported by sufficient evidence.
To this Brennan replied:
The suggestion is appealing, since it would lift
from our shoulders a difficult, recurring, and un-
pleasant task. But we cannot accept it. Such an
abnegation of judicialf supervision in this field
would be inconsistent with our duty to uphold
the constitutional guarantees. Since it is only -
"obscenity" that is excluded from the constitu-
tional protection, the question whether a partic-
ular work is obscene necessarily implicates an
87. Kalven, supra note 6, at 35-40, discusses the case and suggests a dilemma
is presented by the scienter requirement; the vagueness of what is ob-
scene (casually dismissed in Roth) may abort efforts to prove scienter.
If the prosecution has to prove "knowledge" as scienter, the burden
would be an almost impossible one in the case of a bookdealer.
88. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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issue of constitutional law. Such an issue, we
think, must ultimately be decided 'by this Court.
Our duty admits of "no substitute for facing up
to the tough individual problems of constitu-
tional judgment involved in every obscenity
case."
8 9
Thus, Brennan seemed to have come very close to ac-
cepting Harlan's view that each case presents a consti-
tutional question, not one of fact, to be determined ulti-
mately by the Court. Thus, this results in making the
Supreme Court the final arbiter of what is obscene.90 If
this is true, what is the role and function of a jury,
thought to be endowed with special competency in dis-
cerning the "community standard" of obscenity? " Is
the jury merely to act as a "screening committee" which
89. Id. at 187.
90. For a strong criticism of this view of the Court's assuming "an im-
possible task" of applying an "impossible test" (i.e., a "national com-
munity standard") and making an independent decision in each
obscenity case, see O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme
Court: A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NoTaa DmE LAw. 1 (1964).
They suggest the question is one to be left to the jury under proper
instructions-whatever the Supreme Court ultimately decides are
proper instructions on obscenity. O'Meara and Shaffer admit that
a jury could not reflect a "national standard" which to them is pure
fiction. This view is shared by several members of the Court. See
discussion infra, page 318-319. Query as to whether the standard is na-
tional, see infra, page 318-319, 324.
91. Brennan dissenting in Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
448 (1957), suggested a jury trial was necessary in obscenity cases:
"The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury
trial of obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent application
of the standard for judging obscenity which, by its definition, calls for
an appraisal of material according to the average person's application
of contemporary community standards. A statute which does not af-
ford the defendant of right a jury determination of obscenity falls
short, in my view, of giving proper effect to the standard fashioned
as the necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and
press for material which is not obscene."
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determines if the questioned material goes beyond com-
munity standards? What then is the function of the
court? Is it to determine if there is sufficient evidence to
go to the jury? Is it to weigh the obscenity against other
considerations in determining the constitutionality of the
censorship as may be suggested by Dennis?92 Certainly
there is much to be said for a court's having the flnal
decision here when such fundamental concerns as free
press, free speech and free expression must be consid-
ered in conjunction with what may be other valid com-
munity interests and social concerns. Many juries may
be unaware of such constitutional considerations or may
easily lose sight of them.93
Brennan in Jacobellis went on to emphasize, as he had
in Kingsley International Pictures," that:
[O]ur recognition in Roth [was] that obscenity
is excluded the constitutional protection only be-
cause it is utterly without redeeming social im-
portance ... [material] dealing with sex in a
manner that advocates ideas, . . . or that has
literary or scientific or artistic value or any form
of social importance, may not be branded as
obscenity.... Nor may the constitutional status
of the material be made to turn ona "weighing"
of its social importance against its prurient ap-
peal, for a work cannot be proscribed unless it is
"utterly without social importance.) 95
Thus Brennan seemed to say that "utterly" means
92. Supra note 67.
93. It is not difficult to find intelligent, concerned people who consider
the problem to be a simple one of "getting rid of the dirty books," un-
aware that legitimate, basic questions of freedom of expression are in-
volved. One is reminded of the early case of Bennett v. United Statei
where the court quite easily stated, "There is no question of freedom of
the press." See supra, page 295-296.
94. Supra note 82.
95. Supra note 88, at 193.
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precisely what it says. Brennan continued to say that
"it should also be recognized that the Roth standard
requires in the first instance a finding that the material
'goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor
in description or representation of such matters.' This
was a requirement of the Model Penal Code test that we
approved in Roth." Further, Brennan suggested that the
"contemporary community standard" of Roth is not a
local one, but is "society at large, the public, or people
in general. ""
Justice Stewart concurred in Jacobellis, acknowledging
that Roth was susceptible to several interpretations, but
expressed the view that censorship, under the first and
fourteenth amendments, is limited to "hard-core porno-
graphy," which Stewart did not define beyond saying, "I
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in
this case is not that."9 7
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Clark, dissented be-
lieving that Roth had established a workable standard,
not without its problems which, much like "negligence,"
must be tempered with a rule of reason. More signific-
antly, Clark and Warren felt that the "community stand-
ard" of Roth meant community standard, not a national
standard, which to them was a standard that was not
provable. Warren acknowledged and seems to accept that
the result of such a standard might well be the banning
of a book in one community but not in another." To
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id. at 197. Query as to whether such a definition would meet due
process requirements. Later, in Ginzburg, Stewart, without attempting
to define "hard-core," gave a description of "hard-core." 383 U.S. at
499, n. 3.
98. Would such an approach allow for the flexibility and experimenta-
tion urged by Harlan? On the other hand, how could a publisher of
questionable material determine the community standard of numerous
communities? Would this in itself have an inhibiting effect on distri-
bution of questionable material which would not be obscene?
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Warren and Clark, the role of the Supreme Court in
obscenity cases, under the Roth rule, should be limited
to a review of whether there was "sufficient" evidence
for a finding of obscenity, and the Court would thus not
act as the ultimate censor. On this basis Warren and
Clark would have affirmed the conviction. Warren again
expressed his concern with quibbling over definitions of
obscenity while "those who profit from the commercial
exploitation of obscenity continue to ply their trade un-
molested." To Warren the use to which materials are
put should be considered: "a technical or legal treatise
on pornography may well be inoffensive under most cir-
cumstances but obscene when sold or displayed to chil-
dren."' 9
Although Jacobellis raised more questions than it an-
swered, the relatively quiet water which had existed from
1957 was churned into white water in June of 1966 by a
torrent of 14 opinions handed down in Ginzbury, "I Mish-
kinW1 and Fanny Hill."0 2 From the diversity of opinions,
it is difficult to determine what course the Court is chart-
ing for the future. Perhaps the safest comment is that the
Court has not yet realized any unanimity as to what port
it is headed for, nor a course to plot.
Ginzburg, the most publicized of the three, involved a
prosecution for mailing, in violation of federal statutes,
three publications allegedly obscene: a magazine entitled
Eros, a newsletter called Liason, and The Housewife's
Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. Ralph Ginzburg, the
publisher-defendant, was a New Yorker, but the criminal
prosecution was initiated not in New York but in Phil-
adelphia under an amendment to the obscene mail statute,
made in 1958, which permitted prosecution not only where
99. Supra note 88, at 201.
100. Supra note 2.
101. Supra note 3.
102. Supra note 4.
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the obscene material is mailed, but where it is received.10
Ginzburg had waived a jury and was found guilty by the
trial judge. 4 After it was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals,'01 it was brought to the Supreme Court. Five jus-
tices voted to affirm the conviction with four dissenting.
Brennan again spoke for the majority, but the previously
expressed views of Warren stand out clearly in the opin-
ion. The second paragraph of the opinion contains much
of what is significant in Ginzburg:
In the cases in which this Court has decided ob-
scenity questions since Roth, it has regarded the
materials as sufficient in themselves for the de-
termination of the question. In the present ease,
however, the prosecution charged the offense in
the context of the circumstances of production,
sale, and publicity and assumed that, standing
alone, the publications themselves might not be
obscene. We agree that the question of obscenity
may include consideration of the setting in which
the publications were presented as an aid to de-
termining the question of obscenity, and assume
without deciding that the prosecution could not
have succeeded otherwise. ... [W] e view the
publications against a background of commercial
exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their
103. 18 U.S.C. 3237. Is talk of a "national" community standard aca-
demic in the case of a publication mailed to points all over the
United States, and a prosecutor is free to select the most favorable
community? Warren and Clark appear to think this is the case. In-
deed, Ralph Ginzberg has suggested that this is precisely what happened
in his case and that Philadelphia was picked for its favorable climate
as it was in the midst of a crusade against "smut." For Ginzburg's
account of the case, see FACT Magazine, vol. 2, no. 3, May-June, 1965.
For an outstanding study of the statute, see Multi-Venue and the Ob-
scenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 399 (1967). The constitution-
ality of the multi-venue statute is currently being challenged. See
Ablard, supra note 6, at 91, n. 33.
104. 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
105. 338 F. 2d. 12 (3d Cir. 1964).
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prurient appeal. The record in that regard am-
ply supports the decision of the trial judge .... 106
What was this background which made these publica-
tions the "stock in trade of the sordid business of pan-
dering"? Eros had sought mailing privileges from the
post offices in Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania,
and had obtained such privilege from Middlesex, New
Jersey. According to the majority, the "leer of the
sensualist" permeated the advertisement of the publica-
tions, circulars stressed the sexual candor of the publica-
ions, and the publishers emphasized that they would take
full advantage of the unrestricted license they felt the law
allowed. The solicitation for subscriptions and sales was
widespread and apparently indiscriminate. 1 7 From this
Brennan concluded:
The deliberate representation of petitioner's
publications as erotically arousing, for example,
stimulated the reader to accept them as prurient;
he looks for titillation, not for any saving in-
tellectual content. Similarly, such representation
would tend to force public confrontation with the
potentially offensive aspects of the work; the
brazenness of such an appeal heightens the of-
fensiveness of the publications to those who are
offended by such material. And the circum-
stances of presentation and dissemination of ma-
terial are equally relevant to determining wheth-
er social importance claimed for material in the
courtroom was, in the circumstances, pretense
or reality-whether it was the basis upon which
it was traded in the market place or a spurious
claim for litigation purposes. Where the purvey-
106. Supra note 2, at 465-466.
107. Ginzburg himself admitted that mailing lists obtained from other
magazines were used for advertisement for Eros. FACT Magazine,
supra note 103.
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or's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, that fact may be de-
cisive in the determination of obscenity.... The
fact that they are used as a subject of pandering
is relevant to the application of the Roth test. 0 '
Is the Court suggesting that because of the offensive
character of the advertisement and circulars sent out,
which in many cases would be received unsolicited, the
publications may be held to be obscene? It should be noted
that the government at the trial had stipulated that the
circulars were themselves not obscene. "' Is the Court sug-
gesting that, in a close case, "pandering" will swing the
balance? If so, why only in a close case? Brennan later
stated: "We perceive no threat to First Amendment
guarantees in thus holding that in close cases evidence
of pandering may be probative with respect to the nature
of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth
test.""' Or is the Court in effect saying that if the pur-
veyor "labels" it as obscene by advertisement appealing
to the prurient interest, then the Court will accept that
evaluation? The Court later, in pointing out that its
pandering test would not necessarily be a blanket sup-
pression of materials found obscene, said: "All that will
have been determined is that questionable publications
are obscene in a context which brands them as obscene
as that term is defined in Roth . .. .". In other words,
without the pandering the materials might not be ob-
scene. The Court also stated in reference to the Hand-
book: "They proclaimed its obscenity; and we cannot
conclude that the court -below erred in taking their own
evaluation at its face value and declaring the book as a
108. Supra note 2, at 470-471.
109. Id. at 465, n. 4.
110. Id. at 474.
111. Id. at 475.
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whole obscene ... .""' Has the Court returned in some
respects to the "partly obscene test" of Hicklin7"5
Clearly the Court has said the pandering aspect is a part
of the Roth test. How can this be squared with the "utter-
ly without redeeming social importance" requirement of
Roth which Brennan in Kingsley Books indicated was
not a weighing process?
Black dissented in Ginzburg, restating his view that the
federal government "is without any power whatever
under the Constitution to put any type of burden on
speech and expression of ideas of any kind (as distin-
guished from conduct)." ' However, Black had .other
basic objections to the Ginzburg conviction. To Black (a
view also shared by Harlan) Ginzburg was being con-
victed by an ex post facto rewriting of the federal statute
by the adoption of standards not contemplated by Con-
gress, with the result that Ginzburg was convicted Under
an "amended" statute on which he had not been charged
in the trial court.1 5 Further, Black felt that the guidelines
established by the majority in Ginzburg were so vague
as to be meaningless, leaving an accused's fate to the
whim of the trier of fact."' For Black, the judgment as to
112. Id. at 472.
113. Or even a wholly "non-obscene test"? The majority seemed to con-
sider that the obscenity of the material itself was immaterial if there
was pandering. How can the language in a "close case" be recon-
ciled? The trial judge had concluded that only 4 of 15 articles
in Eros were obscene. Id. at 471.
114. Id. at 476.
115. Ablard, supra note 6, at 89 points out that the brief of the Solicitor
General did not even make the argument regarding advertisement
in Ginzburg but argued that the material was obscene within the
Roth definition. Ablard suggests that the pandering concept and
stress on conduct was not a totally new direction in the law of ob-
scenity but was a refinement of Warren's dissent in Roth. Id at 88.
One may well agree with this, but can a dissenting opinion justify
ex post facto amending of a criminal statute?
116. Black's interpretation of Ginzburg, Mivhkin and Fanny Hill was that
three things must be proven to establish material as obscene: (1)
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"prurient appeal" is so subjective as to produce no hope
for uniformity in enforcement. Black further found no
guidance as to whether the "community standards" are
world-wide, nation-wide, section-wide, state-wide, county-
wide, precinct or township-wide. In the final analysis
he found it would be a personal judgment, the product of
the attitude of the particular individual and place where
the trial is held.
Harlan would have reversed Ginzburg's conviction un-
der his view that the federal government can constitu-
tionally ban only "hard-core pornography." He had ad-
ditional difficulty with the majority ruling:
The First Amendment, in the obscenity area, no
longer fully protects material on its face non-
obscene, for such material must now also be
examined in the light of the defendant's conduct,
attitude, motives. This seems to me a mere
euphemism for allowing punishment of a person
who mails otherwise constitutionally protected
material just because a jury or a judge may not
find him or his business agreeable. Were a State
to enact a "panderer" statute under its police
power, I have little doubt that-subject to clear
drafting to avoid attacks on vagueness and equal
protection grounds-such a statute would be con-
stitutional .... What I fear the Court has done
today is in effect to write a new statute, but with-
out the sharply focused definitions and stand-
ards necessary in such a sensitive area. Casting
such a dubious gloss over a straightforward 101-
year-old statute is for me an astonishing piece
of judicial improvisation.
It seems perfectly clear that the theory on which
these convictions are now sustained is quite dif-
appeal to the prurient interest, (2) patently offensive and (3) no re-
deeming social value. Supra note 2, at 478-480.
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ferent from the basis on which the case was tried
and decided and affirmed. 11 T
Stewart dissented, restating his view expressed in
Jacobellis that only "hard-core pornography" could be
suppressed. He believed that the material in Ginzburg
was not hard-core and would have reversed the convic-
tion. He also set forth his view on the meaning of the
first amendment:
Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence
in itself. It is a hallmark of an authoritarian
regime. Long ago those who wrote our First
Amendment charted a different course. They be-
lieved a society can truly be strong only when it
is truly free. In the realm of expression they put
their faith, for better or for worse, in the en-
lightened choice of the people, free from the in-
terference of a policeman's intrusive thumb or
a judge's heavy hand. So it is that the Constitu-
tion protects coarse expression as well as refined
and vulgarity no less than elegance. A book
worthless to me, may convey something of value
to my neighbor. In the free society to which our
Constitution has committed us, it is for each to
choose for himself.'1 8
Douglas, dissenting in both Ginzburg and Mishkin,
would go even further with this "freedom of choice"
idea:
Some of the tracts. for which these publishers go
to prison concern normal sex, some homosexual-
ity, some the masochistic yearning that is prob-.
ably present in everyone and dominant in some.
.... Why is it unlawful to cater to the ineeds of
117. Id. at 494-495.
118. Id. at 498.
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this group? They are, to be sure, somewhat off-
beat, nonconformist, and odd. But we are not in
the realm of criminal conduct, only ideas and
tastes. Some like Chopin, others like "rock and
roll." Some are "normal," some are masochistic,
some deviant in other respects, such as the homo-
sexual .... But why is freedom of the press and
expression denied them? Are they to be barred
from communicating in symbolisms important to
them? When the Court today speaks of "social
value," does it mean a "value" to the majority?
Why is not a minority "value" cognizable? The
masochistic group is one; the deviant group is
another. Is it not important that members of
those groups communicate with each other? . ..
If we were wise enough, we might know that
communication may have greater therapeutical
value than any sermon that those of the "nor-
mal" community can ever offer. But if the com-
munication is of value to the masochistic com-
munity or to others of the deviant community,
how can it be said to be "utterly without any
redeeming social importance"? . .. Catering to
the most eccentric taste may have "social im-
portance" in giving that minority an oppor-
tunity to express itself rather than to repress its
inner desires.... How can we know that this ex-
pression may not prevent anti-social conduct?'
Brennan again wrote for the majority in Mishkin.2 °
in upholding Mishkin's conviction under a New York
statute for publishing and possessing obscene books with
intent to sell them. In the opinion of the majority, Mishkin
was convicted not for what he said or believed but for
his conduct in producing and selling some 50 "pulp"
books, many dealing with deviations such as sadomacho-
119. Id. at 489-491.
120. Supra note 3.
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ism, fetishism, and homosexuality. Many of the books had
covers showing scantily clad women being whipped, beat-
en, tortured or abused. One author testified that Mishkin
insisted that the books be "full of sex scenes and lesbian
scenes ... the sex had to be very strong... it had to be
clearly spelled out.., the sex scenes had to be unusual
sex scenes between men and women, and women and
women, and men and men.., sex in an abnormal and
irregular fashion.""'2 Mishkin had provided the authors
with a text on abnormal sex behavior as a source of
material.
The majority took the view that the New York courts,
in the statute involved, had interpreted obscene to cover
only "hard-core pornography" which the majority con-
sidered more stringent than the Roth definition and thus
within constitutional bounds.
One of Mishkin's arguments was somewhat novel. He
argued that the material on flagellation, fetishism and
lesbianism was so bad that it did not appeal to the aver-
age person's prurient interest and "instead of stim-
ulating the erotic, they disgust and sicken." Brennan re-
sponded to this argument by saying:
Where the material is designed for and pri-
marily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant
sexual group, rather than the public at large, the
prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is
satisfied if the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest
in sex of the members of that group .... We
adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social
realities by permitting the appeal of this type of
material to be assessed in terms of the sexual in-
terests of its intended and probable recipient
group; and since our holding requires that the
121. Id. at 505.
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recipient group be defined with more specificity
than in terms of sexually immature persons, it
also avoids the inadequacy of the most-suscepti-
ble-person facet of the Hicklin test.'22
Stewart again dissented believing that the material was
not hard-core. Black also dissented, expressing his view
that the Court was without constitutional power to censor
speech or press, regardless of the particular subject dis-
cussed. Black also felt that if there must be censorship
the federal judiciary was the least appropriate branch
of government to take over such responsibilities.
Fanny Hill2 "' also elicited a diversity of views, with
five written opinions. Fanny Hill was not a criminal
prosecution, as in Ginzburg and Mishkin, but was an in
rem proceeding brought under Massachusetts statutes to
have the book declared obscene. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court had affirmed the finding that Fanny
Hill was obscene. 24 However, this was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. Brennan, in an opinion
joined by Fortas and Warren, voted for reversal. They
concluded that the Massachusetts court had misinter-
preted and misapplied an element of the Roth test. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had said: "We
do not interpret the 'social importance' test as requiring
that a book which appeals to prurient interest and is
122. Id. at 508-509. Is the Court re-introducing a form of the Hicklin
"least common denominator" test, i.e., appeal to the prurient interest
of a deviant group? From the last sentence of the quote it would ap-
pear that the Court felt it was avoiding this aspect of Hicklin.
123. Supra note 4.
124. Attorney General v. A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure, 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E. 2d 403 (1965). Under the
Massachusetts statute this finding would have been conclusive in
Massachusetts in subsequent actions. The practical effect of such
an in rem finding would be a banning of the book throughout Massa-
chusetts.
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patently offensive must be unqualifiedly worthless be-
fore it can be deemed obscene." 22
To this Brennan replied:
The Supreme Judicial Court erred in holding
that a book need not be "unqualifiedly worthless
before it can be deemed obscene." A book cannot
be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly
without redeeming social value. This is so even
though the -book is found to possess the requisite
prurient appeal and to be patently offensive.
Each of the three federal constitutional criteria
is to be applied independently; the social value
of the book can neither be weighed against nor
canceled by its prurient appeal or patent offens-
iveness." 6
Brennan pointed out that Memoirs (Fanny Hill)
was being judged in the abstract and that circumstances
of production, sale and publicity had not been considered,
but stated that such factors would be relevant in deter-
mining if a book is constitutionally protected and as in
Ginzburg "where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the
sexually provocative aspects of his publications, a court
could accept his evaluation at its face value." 2 '
125. Id. at 72.
126. Fanny Hill, supra note 4, at 419.
127. Ibid. From the tone of the opinion and some of the language used,
the writer gets the impression that a significant number of the Court
would be quite unwilling to uphold an abstract per se determination
of obscene. Brennan, speaking for the "majority" said that in judging
in the abstract all possible uses would have to be considered, but that
a book found not obscene in the abstract could be obscene under the
pandering concept. Gerber, supra note 81, at 855, suggested prior to
Fanny Hill that the law should develop to the point where nothing
would be obscene in the abstract. In the comment, Religious Insti-
tutions and Values, supra note 14, at 771, this conclusion was drawn:
"Far more importantly Ginzburg-along with Fanny Hill and Mish-
kin-may signal the beginning of the end of obscenity regulation
premised on the nature of the material alone." Query, why did Bren-
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Douglas concurred in the result, but preferred to base
reversal on his view that the "First Amendment does not
permit the censorship of expression not brigaded with
illegal action" although he considered the record devoid
of any proof that the book was "utterly without re-
deeming social importance." To Douglas the absolute
terms of the first amendment were to guarantee freedom
of expression of dissenters and minorities but "censor-
ship is the most notorious form of abridgment. It sub-
stitutes majority rule where minority tastes or viewpoints
were to be tolerated.") 2 8
Justice Clark felt constrained to speak out in dissent:
"I have 'stomached' past cases for almost ten years with-
out much outcry. Though I am not known to be a purist-
or a shrinking violet-this book is too much even for
me. 1' 2  Clark felt that the opinion of Brennan in Fanny
Hill was adding to the Roth test in which Clark had been
the deciding vote. In Clark's view Roth had established
only a two element test: the book must be (1) judged as a
whole, and (2) judged in terms of its appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person applying con-
temporary community standards. 3 '
nan select Fanny Hill to emphasize "utterly without redeeming social
value" rather than Ginzburg? In Ginzburg part of the material clear-
ly had social value. See supra note 113.
128. Fanny Hill, supra note 4, at 427.
129. Id. at 441.
130. Clark's formula of Roth seems to be this: Dominant appeal taken
as a whole + prurient appeal by community standards = obscenity
of such slight social value that it is not constitutionally protected.
Clark's view does find some support in the language used by Bren-
nan in Roth. Would Clark's position be more tenable, in the light of
the language of Roth, if his formula were: Dominant appeal +
prurient appeal judged by community standards = utterly without
redeeming social value, therefore not within the protection of the
first amendment? Brennan's Fanny Hill formula seems to be: Dom-
inant appeal taken as a whole, which appeals to prurient interest
+ patently offensive by contemporary community standards + utterly
without redeeming social value = obscenity not within the protec-
tion of the first amendment.
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Clark acknowledged that Brennan had referred to "ut-
terly without redeeming social value" in Jacobellis, but
argued that it had not been suggested as a requirement
until Fanny HZll. Clark suggests that Brennan's "utterly
without redeeming social value" requirement has re-in-
troduced the question of whether there is any relationship
between obscene publications and anti-social conduct. 1 '
Clark said:
The question of anti-social conduct thus becomes
relevant to the more limited question of social
value. Brother Brennan indicates that the so-
cial importance criteria encompasses only such
things as the artistic, literary, and historical
qualities of the material. But the phrasing of the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test
suggests that other evidence must be considered.
To say that social value may "redeem" implies
that courts may balance alleged esthetic merit
against the harmful consequences that may flow
from pornography. . . . It at least anticipates
that the trier of fact weigh evidence of the ma-
terial's influence in causing deviant or criminal
conduct, particularly sex crimes, as well as its
effect upon the mental, moral and physical health
of the average person. 3 2
Harlan would have upheld the finding in Fanny Hill
under his view that the fourteenth amendment controls
in state censorship of obscenity and requires of a state
"only that it apply criteria rationally related to the ac-
cepted notion of obscenity and that it reach results not
wholly out of step with current American standards." '
131. This was one of the problems which was ducked by Roth's evasion
of the "clear and present danger" test. See supra, pages 305-306.
132. Fanny Hill, supra note 4, at 451, Douglas would argue that obscenity
itself may have social value. See infra, pages 325-326.
133. Id. at 458.
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White, in dissent also, read Roth as establishing a two
element formula for obscenity: predominant theme ap-
peals to the prurient interest + exceeding customary
limits of candor=utterly without redeeming social value
which is, therefore, not within the protection of the first
amendment. In White's view "social importance" is not
an independent test "but is relevant only in determining
the predominant prurient interest of the material ....'
The Aftermath
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Fanny Hill, made this
observation: "The central development that emerges
from the aftermath of Roth... is that no stable approach
to the obscenity problem has yet been devised by this
Court. I"' If this observation is true, perhaps part of the
fault is that a stable approach has not yet been presented
to the Court. To the writer the pandering concept intro-
duced in Ginzburg is a laudable development in many re-
spects. However, one may disagree with the judicial
amending of the statute and feel that the change should
have come from the legislative branch. It is apparent that
the Court has been influenced by the American Law In-
stitute's Model Penal Code. In Roth the Model Penal
Code definition of obscenity was inserted by Brennan,
although he suggested it made no change in the case law
definition. The pandering concept is the heart of the
Model Penal Code approach to control of obscene publi-
cations.'36 The pandering concept and Fanny Hill make it
134. Id. at 462.
135. Id. at 455.
136. "The gist of the offense we envisage, therefore, is a kind of 'pander-
ing,'" MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
For a discussion of the Model Penal Code approach see Schwartz,
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 Co.. L. RE v. 669
(1963). Gerber, supra note 81, at 838, says that the Model Penal
Code which appeared shortly before Roth merely served to compound
the confusion.
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clear that obscenity is not a constant, but a variable de-
pending on yet unknown factors. In this respect, the shift
of emphasis, if there has been a shift, from the material
itself, to the conduct of the panderer may be a welcome
development. Such an emphasis would put the approach
to obscenity nearer to the traditional concern of criminal
law-anti-social conduct." 7 On the other hand, has the
pandering concept merely pushed the battleground from
the book to the bookdealer or publisher? What is "pan-
dering" and how much exploitation of sex and erotica is
permissable? Much legitimate advertisement makes use
of "sex appeal." Ginzburg suggests the advertisement
itself need not be obscene. Is pandering a variable--the
same in Berkeley as in the "Bible Belt"? Is it to be used
only in close cases? How is the pandering concept rec-
onciled with Brennan's element of "utterly without re-
deeming social value"? At this point whether Brennan's
view on this will prevail is not clear, as Brennan ap-
parently spoke only for himself and two others. The ques-
tion of whether it is to be a "national standard" is still
unresolved and in the view of Clark and Warren a na-
tional standard does not exist and could not be applied if
it did. Even the question of whether there should be any
censorship is still being debated by the Court. The pre-
viously unresolved questions and the additional questions
raised by Ginzburg, Mishkin and Fanny Hill are legion
and have been adequately dealt with elsewhere. 1 8
Before considering alternatives to whatever approach
the Supreme Court may be taking, and considering what
should be done, the aims or justification of censorship of
obscenity should be considered to give some basis for
evaluation.
137. See comment, Religious Institutions and Values, supra note 14, at
771.
138. See especially Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grape3 of Roth, 1966
SUPREr CouRT REvrEw 1; Monahan, supra note 69; Sebastian, Ob-
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Censorship-Why?
Unfortunately, courts, legislatures, and proponents
have failed to clearly articulate the justification or rea-
sons for censorship. Treatment of the aims of censorship
has been left primarily to writers and opponents of cen-
sorship who have suggested reasons and then proceeded
to refute the validity of their rationale. The liberal "free
speech-free press" opponents of censorship have many
times appeared to win by default, being more articulate in
expounding the dangers of censorship and the virtue of
free unlimited expression. The values of freedom of
expression are unquestioned. Free speech, in its broad
sense, is the testing ground and crucible of thoughts,
ideologies and political, social and religious philosophies
and theories-popular and unpopular, just and unjust,
good and bad-and the medium through which the rights
and needs of the minority, as well as the majority and
dissenters are protected and respected. The hope and be-
lief is that out of such free exchange will come innova-
tions and progress, "wisdom" and "good." Douglas 3 '
and Stewart' ° have clearly challenged with an alter-
native: Are we willing to live by this ideal of the first
amendment? Is this what Brenan is trying to say with
his "utterly without redeeming social value" require-
ment? That is, if the expression contains any idea or
thought-good or bad, accepted or unaccepted-it is im-
mune from censorship and cannot be banned in the ab-
stract and in the proper context? Is Brennan grasping for
what may be unobtainable, to keep all that has the slight-
est thematic value, yet to ban that which contributes
nothing? As Harlan asked, is social value in expression
scenity and the Supreme Court: Nine Years of Confusion, 19 STAN.
L. REv. 167 (1966).
139. Supra, page 312.
140. Supra, page 325.
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limited to propounding of ideas and thoughts? What is
and how do we judge "social value"? Douglas in reply
would ask, may not pornography be of social value to
those who have an interest in its prurient appeal? May
it not be of therapeutic or cathartic value reducing anti-
social conduct? White would ask, does not the fact that
people buy and use pornography show its social value?
Will banning of the "bad" tend to suppress the "good"?
The dividing line is not clear and uncertainty as to where
the line can and will be drawn under penal threat may
well have an inhibiting effect.141 In the area of obscenity,
at some point there must be a balancing of the values of
free expression against any curbing of unlimited expres-
sion to protect other values of society. I submit that this
is what Brennan is attempting to do in moving toward
banning nothing in the abstract but banning some things
used in the wrong context. What then are the values of
society that censorship seeks to protect ? 1 2
(1) Offensiveness. The argument here is that to many
141. It should be noted that the rationale of Smith v. California, supra
note 85, holding unconstitutional a statute which required no ele-
ment of scienter, was the indirect inhibiting effect of the statute.
142. The best discussion of the goals or aims of censorship are: Lockhart
& McClure, supra note 8, at 368-387; Sebastian, supra note 138 at
172-176; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,
63 COL. L. Rav. 391 (1963). The latter is an excellent treatment of
the moral and religious factors involved in censorship of obscenity.
Henkin's position, somewhat simplified, is that obscenity regulation
is legislation aimed at "sin." He concludes: "Laws against obscen-
ity reflect values of morality, decency, and modesty inherited from
an earlier age and from religious ancestors. These laws reflect, too,
assumptions about the nature of character and morals. They assume
a concept of 'corruption of morals' and assume that obscene mater-
ial has such a corrupting effect." Id. at 411. For a reply to this
see Schwartz, supra note 136, at 669-673. The best apology for
censorship is found in the comments of the Model Penal Code, supra
note 7. It is indeed unfortunate that more proponents of censorship
do not inform themselves about what the reporters of the Model
Penal Code say in defense of their position. They might speak with
a better voice.
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persons, pornography and obscene material are offensive
and shocking and that therefore the state may protect
citizens from such offensive material. The quick rejoinder
made to this, in the area of written material, is that one is
not involuntarily exposed to the contents of a book and
should not complain or have to be protected from being
offended by that which he seeks out. There is no obliga-
tion to continue reading that which is offensive. If pro-
tection from the offensive is a valid factor, is the current
(?) definition of obscenity-that which appeals to the
prurient interest-in step with this aim?4"'
(2) Obscene literature and pornography produce a
stimulation of sexual impulses and thoughts that lead- to
conduct contrary to the laws of accepted moral conduct.
The customary reply given to this is that there is no
empirical or other reliable data which demonstrates that
there is any cause-effect relationship between reading
pornography and anti-social or criminal conduct."' The
argument is that it has not been shown that such material
leads to conduct, and in fact may prevent anti-social con-
duct - ' The concern of criminal law has always been with
143. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 8, at 378, n. 495, suggest that the ob-
jection of the censors "is not that these books offend readers but
that they delight them." They later said, "For hard core pornog-
raphy appeals to the sexually immature because it feeds their crav-
ing for erotic fantasy; to the normal, sexually mature person it is
repulsive, not attractive." Supra note 53, at 72.
144. For an excellent survey of the empirical and scientific data on the
cause-effect problem see Cairns, Paul and Wishner, supra note 27;
Rogers, supra note 1, at 431-438, discusses studies subsequent to those
in Cairn, et al. See also Judge Frank's concurring opinion in United
States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 811-816 (2d Cir. 1956).
145. Douglas suggests that pornography may provide a "release valve"
preventing unlawful conduct. See supra, pages 325-326. Clark, dissenting
in Fanny Hill, 383 U.S. at 451-2, concludes that the evidence is not
as clear as Douglas presents it, and 'that there is reliable informa-
tion indicating such material does contribute to anti-social conduct.
Harlan takes the view that a state legislature could rationally believe
there is a cause-effect relation and legislate on that basis. Supra,
page 309.
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conduct, and mere thoughts without action have generally
not been considered a proper area for imposing penal
sanctions. If the aim is to prevent "evil thoughts," what
thoughts are "evil"? Lockhart and McClure have
pointed out that the creation of normal sexual thoughts
and desire is neither immoral nor contrary to accepted
sex standards, but is perfectly normal, natural and an
absence of them would be abnormal.146 If this be admitted
as to "normal" thoughts, is there a valid interest in pro-
tecting against stimulation of abnormal, deviant sex
thoughts? Should we tolerate material which encourages
such thoughts, even if there is no link to conduct? As
Rogers"I7 has pointed out, much of the obscene material
today deals with aberrant behavior. Many today would
say that we should not encourage thoughts concerning the
abnormal, but is this a valid basis for censorship ? If ob-
scenity legislation is aimed at sex thoughts, why should
such thoughts be treated any differently than other
thoughts or other "bad thoughts"? The causes of "evil"
thoughts are complex; why proscribe only the obscene
stimuli for such thoughts? Is legislating against "sinful
thoughts" a valid governmental concern or one that un-
der our constitutional system should be left to other
means of controlling and influencing behavior and es-
tablishing moral and spiritual concepts, such as the fam-
ily, the church and education? Another comment which is
often made here is that, if preventing thoughts and con-
duct is the aim, the present approach of censorship has
been a miserable failure.
(3) Ideological element. The reasoning given here is
that by controlling obscenity the state seeks to protect the
current moral standards from criticism or from being
questioned. Under this view, widespread circulation of ob-
146. Supra note 8, at 379-382. They also suggest that a stimulation of
normal sex thoughts may often be in the public interest.
147. Se pa note 1.
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scenity and material dealing with deviant sexual behavior
may lead to a belief that one's morals are out of date, and
to a questioning of whether they are out of step with the
accepted mores. The fear is that the result will be a
change in accepted standards. Certainly society has and
should be interested in maintaining acceptable standards
of conduct and certainly conduct is affected by what is
thought to be "acceptable." However, can the espousal
of ideas-however unpopular and non-acceptable to the
majority-constitutionally be suppressed ? The Court has
been quite clear in its opposition to any type of "ideolo-
gical or thematic" censorship as shown by Kingsley Pic-
tures." 8 Should ideas regarding sex and sex behavior be
treated differently from other ideas ? Or are there certain
basic standards which should not be open to challenge 111
(4) Prevention of extra-legal censorship. Every state
and many foreign countries have some type of control of
obscene publications. This is certainly some expression
of the feeling of need for such control, whatever may be
the unarticulated or poorly expressed reason. Without
legal redress or a means to control what to many is a
very basic problem, the argument is made that "vigil-
148. Supra note 82.
149. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 8, at 375 suggest, "The remedy
against those who attack currently accepted standards is spirited and
intelligent defense of those standards, not censorhip. This is the re-
medy guaranteed and required by the Constitution. Only through
unlimited examination and re-examination, attack and defense, can
come the ultimate perfection of these standards, and the understand-
ing and grasp of the reasons that alone will insure their preserva-
tion, if sound." Is this too much fine theory, with its underlying
assumption that such decisions as to standards will be made rationally,
not emotionally, and that those making the choice are mature and
qualified to make such decisions? Should "freedom of choice" be
extended to all in the area of obscene publications or limited to those
mature enough to make a more rational choice? Does youth seek out
pornography for its saving ideological content or merely for its erotic
value? Should there be a limited "Big Brother approach" here for
youth? All censorship has a Big Brother quality.
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ante" action would produce far greater harmful results
than would any legal system supervised by the courts.
Legal means of censorship reduce the pressure for
"vigilante" or citizens' groups which might otherwise
exercise almost unlimited censorship powers and fail to
consider other basic values in their zeal to wipe out ob-
scenity. To the writer, "vigilante" action does not pre-
sent an attractive alternative to a legal approach -to
censorship.""0 Certainly those fearful of the harm which
may result from obscenity cannot be denied the right to
propagandize against dissemination of such materials as
long as they do not use unlawful methods. Perhaps the
liberal opponents of any type of censorship might well
150. One needs only look at the history of such vigilante action to respect
and fear the results. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 8, at 302-320,
give an excellent account of how extra-legal organizations and groups
operate. They describe the activities of groups such as the National
Organization for Decent Literature, NODL, their standards or codes
for censorship and their effectiveness through such means as black-
lists of books, boycotts, direct contact with bookdealers and publishers
and pressing for enforcement of obscenity laws. Such groups in many
areas have been quite effective. Id. at 305, n. 71. In some areas
they have succeeded in suppressing the sale of 300-750 paperback
books. Id. at 310-311. However admirable the intent of such groups,
one needs only to look at the impressive list of books, cited by Lock-
hart and McClure, which have been "banned," to become quite con-
cerned with the result of secret blacklists based on clearly unconsti-
tutional standards of obscenity. A partial list of blacklisted books
shows the insidious nature of such unbridled cenorship: Ernest Hem-
ingway's A Farewell to Arms; James A. Michener's Tales of the
South Pacific; Irwin Shaw's The roung Lions; Boccaccio's Decain-
eron and Flaubert's Madam Bovary. Lockhart and McClure, supra
note 53, at 6 continue their account of the methods and targets of
the proponents of censorship and point out that beginning around
1957 there was an increase in the practice of using "blacklists" by
police and prosecutors with threats of prosecution to dealers selling
listed books. In some instances this practice was restrained by injunc-
tion. Id. at 7-8. Following this there was a rise in new organizations
such as Citizens for Decent Literature, CDL, which have confined
their activities more to arousing public opinion and encouraging
and assisting law enforcement officials. Rogers, supra note 1, at 438-
442, describes the recent activities of some of these citizen groups,
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consider the alternatives: the very narrowly limited cen-
sorship by legal means as opposed to an effective vigilante
form of censorship which could result in censorship of
material having greater value than the 'borderline ma-
terial presently suppressed under legal methods of
censorship.
A Suggested Approach
From all of the foregoing it is quite apparent that any
sane approach to dealing with obscene publications is
faced with complex problems without many clear guide-
lines as to the legal, political, social and religious factors
which are involved. But in one area in the control of
obscenity, the goal or aims may be clearer and more ac-
ceptable, infringe less on liberties and offer an alter-
native to "vigilante" action. Unfortunately, law enforce-
ment official have not used their strongest point to fight
the smut peddlers nor in many cases have legislatures
provided the machinery to do so. Brennan, in Jacobellis,
suggested the approach: "State and local authorities
might well consider whether their objectives in this area
would be better served by laws aimed specifically at pre-
venting distribution of objectionable material to children,
rather than at totally prohibiting its dissemination.' 'I"
At this point, it is questionable whether it would be
politically expedient or feasible to abandon statutes deal-
ing with distribution of obscenity generally. In the future
their utility may be of little value, depending upon the
development of the concept of pandering, if nothing
is to be obscene in the abstract. Publishers and dealers
may learn to avoid "labelling" as obscene, yet the con-
tent will still be recognizable to those interested. Or
Douglas and Black's view of the first amendment and
151. Supra note 88, at 195.
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obscenity may yet prevail. Overzealous application of
general statutes totally banning dissemination may pro-
duce such a result. In any event a law aimed specifically
at preventing distribution of obscenity to children would
be a helpful supplement or an alternative which might
survive.
Admittedly, even in this -area there can be no complete
reconciliation of freedom of expression and censorship
nor can there be a justification by empirical proof. Yet
such an approach would allow for the saving content of
any idea or other value such material may have for adults
who could exercise their freedom of choice, but would
deny such material to the immature who seek it, not
primarily for its thematic content, but for its erotic value.
Society does have a valid interest in protecting its stand-
ards from erosion by those not mature enough to make
a qualified choice. As has been suggested by many judges
what might not be obscene when disseminated to adults
might well be obscene in the hands of children.
Professor Dibble 2 has suggested an approach, along
with a draft of a statute, which deserves serious consid-
eration by those interested in the problem of obscenity.
That -there are serious problems and questions about the
approach is readily conceded. Dibble's proposal is similar
to the Model Penal Code. Criminal sanctions are placed
on the dissemination of obscene material to children. Ob-
scene material is defined as that which "considered as a
whole, has a predominant appeal to the prurient interest
of children and which goes substantially beyond custo-
mary limits of candor in describing or representing such
matters to children."153 This definition is basically the
152. Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39
So. CALIF. L. REv. 345 (1966). See also Rice, supra note 14. For
a discussion of formulation of a constitutional statute, see Luchsinger,
A Blueprint for Censorship of Obscene Material: Standards for Pro-
cedural Due Process, 11 VILL. L. REv. 125 (1965).
153. Dibble, supra note 152, at 374, Section 1 (). of draft of statute.
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definition of the Model Penal Code which appears to have
been accepted by some members of the Supreme Court,'"
but is modified and cast in terms of prurient appeal to
children. The predominant appeal of material is judged in
terms of "the effect of such material upon a class of chil-
dren of the same general age group as the child to whom
such material was disseminated, such children having
average intelligence, average mental health, and average
moral standards of children of such age group. ' '.5 The
circumstances of dissemination are also to be considered
in determining the prurient appeal. The draft statute also
has other provisions dealing with the problems of knowl-
edge and scienter and proof of obscenity, but the heart of
Dibble's solution is dealing with obscenity where society
has the greatest concern-dissemination and pandering
to children.
Certainly there would be administrative and enforce-
ment problems with such a quarantine, but would these
be greater than those under present statutes dealing with
general bans against distribution of obscenity? Does
Mishkin help-with its suggestion that pandering to the
prurient interests of a well-defined group with material
not appealing to the average person may make such ma-
terial obscene ? Some commentators, prior to Mishkin and
Ginzburg, have suggested that a banning of material ob-
scene for children would not be constitutional because of
the indirect inhibiting effect on dissemination of such
materials to adults.' Dibble suggests such an approach
may be constitutional. In his opinion it is at least worth a
try.
154. Supra, page 307.
155. Dibble, supra note 152, at 375, Section 3(a) of draft of statute.
156. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 53, at 86. Would Fanny Hill lend
support for this view? Ginzburg? The latter seemed to disregard
the indirect consequence of labelling as obscene by pandering in
pointing out that under different circumstances it might not be ob-
scene. See supra, page 322.
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Conclusion
Are there discernable trends in the law of obscenity
today? Discerning trends from the numerous opinions
handed down in each case, often with no real majority
opinion, is almost pure speculation. The unresolved ques-
tions far outnumber the answered. Perhaps the Court is
wise in moving slowly to resolve such basic questions and
conflicting interests and values. Perhaps this is due to
expediency or a lack of suitable alternatives which the
Court might adopt. Perhaps the solution is not within
grasp or the problem should be dealt with by other than
legal processes. To step into the realm of speculation,
some commentators suggest the Court will ultimately
move to strike down all censorship of obscenity. This may
well come about with changes in the members of the
Court. For the present, the Court has undoubtedly been
influenced by the American Law Institute's approach to
obscenity in the Model Penal Code. Significantly, there
appears to have been a shift in emphasis by some mem-
bers of the Court from the material itself to the conduct
of the purveyor, so that the probable result is that ob-
scenity is not an absolute but a variable, depending on
the context. If this is the trend, it may he a welcome de-
velopment-banning nothing in its proper context, but
proscribing some material when pandered or purveyed
solely for its erotic value. If this is the result, legislation
aimed at those who disseminate to children material ob-
scene because of its prurient appeal to children, may fare
better than legislation proscribing dissemination of ob-
scenity in general. Such legislation may also come nearer
to preserving the values of free expression and at the
same time attaining some of the legitimate aims of cens-
orship. The very real problem of obscene publications is
one that cannot be solved solely by legal means.
